GandyDancer LLC v. Rock House CGM, LLC, No. S-1-SC-37201
The court is hearing arguments on whether a business can make use of the Unfair Practices Act against another business for anti-competitive practices that implicate consumer protection concerns, as held by the Court of Appeals. First, the Petitioner argues that the Respondent lacks any standing under the UPA, since it didn’t attempt or acquire goods or services from Petitioner. Petitioner highlights that there is no proscription in the UPA regarding unfair competition, and criticizes the COA opinion for considering out-of-state statutes that it claims are dissimilar because they include provisions regarding unfair competition. Additionally, the Petitioner challenges the ability of Respondent to base a UPA claim off the result of a fully-resolved administrative enforcement action. Respondent disputes that all those issues were preserved, and of course disputes the arguments of Defendant Petitioner.
This one is worth watching to see where the Supreme Court comes down, since it is becoming more commmon for businesses to make use of unfair practices statutes, which traditionally were reserved for consumer protection.
Lewis v. APS, No. S-1-SC-37077
This case began with a claim before the Workers’ Compensation Administration against the Albuquerque Public Schools by a teacher for pulmonary disease caused by mold in her classroom, and the Workers’ Compensation Judge entered a Compensation Order based upon medical testimony. The teacher’s husband and heir brought a claim in the same suit for death benefits, which again led to an award against APS. The Court of Appeals upheld the structure of the award, but overturned the WCJ’s decision to exclude medical expert testimony presented by APS in the death benefits proceedings. The Husband alleges that the Court of Appeals improperly overturned the exclusion of medical expert testimony regarding the teacher’s disease. Husband claims the testimony is limited by Sec. 52-1-51(C) to only the treating physician and an independent medical examiner, while the testimony in question was neither, and that the Supreme Court should base its holding on the alleged intent of the statute to limit expert witnesses in such cases. Husband argues that the Equal Protection Clause of the New Mexico Consititution requires a holding in his favor, as he complied with Sec. 52-1-51(C), and any other result would be unfair and lead to absurd results. Although the doctrine is normally reserved for appellate decisions on trial court proceedings, the Husband also makes a “law of the case” argument, claiming that the prior Compensation Order controls what could be presented in the subsequent death benefits proceedings.
APS brings a cross-petition challenging the COA’s holding that the death benefits claim was brought within the 2-year statute of limitations under Sec. 52-1-46, and should not have been deemed tolled under Sec. 52-1-31(A). APS claims that the WCJ erred in determining when the compensible injury manifested itself, and that it will lead to absurd results if the date of a monetary award is made the compensible injury date.
State v. Villalobos, No. S-1-SC-37103
The State brings its petition under the NM Constitution Art. VI, Sec. 2, alleging that the State was not allowed adequate time to respond to a motion to suppress and locate its own expert witness to rebut Villalobos’ expert witnesses. According to the State, it was only provided a complete motion to suppress 13 days before hearing on the motion, and was unable to determine what the intended testimony of Villalobos’ witnesses would be at trial.
The State also dissputes the trial court’s determination that Villalobos (age 15 at the time of arrest) did not voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. The State believes the facts support a finding of a proper arrest, and a proper adminstration of the Miranda rights, including a cogent and coherent indication of understanding of the Miranda rights by Villalobos. Further, the State alleges that the trial court did not make its decision in accordance with the elements of Sec. 32A-2-14(E), and relied too heavily on the Miranda Rights Comprehension Instruments.
Villalobos files a cross-petition on the sole issue of whether the interaction between Villalobos and officers was a “voluntary encounter,” because the deputy on the scene indicated that he had reasonable suspicion of Villalobos prior to Villalobos returning to the home, the deputy allegedly provided the facts that led to his reasonable suspicion to the sergeant and the detective that detained Villalobos. Villalobos also claims that the detective and sergeant caught Villalobos in a lie while collecting information, but still did not read him his Miranda rights at that time. Villalobos also indicates a discrepancy from the officers regarding recording of the interactions, and notes that the State was in possession of the medical expert witness’ report regarding Villalobos’ competency for over a year and a half prior to the hearing on the motion to suppress.